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Abstract. In the paper we analyze an adverse selection model with 
three states of nature, where both the Principal and the Agent are risk 
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Introduction 
One of the most important researches of economic theory from the last 40 
years is represented by the theory of incentives. This theory has been developed 
also as a necessity to explain some failures of the classical models from 
microeconomic theory. The information became an extremely costly good in 
real economies and the asymmetric information between contractual partners 
may generate some distortion of the results with respect to optimal Pareto 
results. Asymmetric information is present in almost all economic activities: 
there are incentives to work hard, to produce high quality goods, incentives to 
invest or to save, to reveal the correct characteristics to other partners. The 
adverse selection models were built in this context; they model situations where 
the decisions of player (named the Agent) having private information depend on 
this private information and could negatively affect others participants; the 
party making the contractual offer and who doesn’t know the Agent’ private 
information is attempting to reduce this informational disadvantage. 
The pioneering article studying the classical approach to the adverse 
selection problem is Mirrlees (1971). After this article, the initial adverse selection 
models were developed in many theoretical and empirical ways. Some important 
contributions belong to Green and Laffont (1987), Myerson (1979), Dasgupta, 
Hammond and Maskin (1979), who studied the Revelation Principle; the problem 
with a continuum of types has been studied by Baron and Myerson (1982). A 
general characterization of necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of 
a second best optimum was given by Guesnerie and Laffont (1984); Jullien (2000) 
and Rochet and Stole (2002) extended the classical models and introduced the 
type-dependent and random participation constraints; Armstrong and Rochet 
(1999) analyzed  aspects regarding multidimensional asymmetric information. 
There has been a considerable theoretical analysis of different models in 
this theory of incentives and this analysis advanced also in the empirical area. 
The empirical studies are various and refer to almost all economic activities: 
nonlinear pricing (Musa, Rosen, 1978, Maskin, Riley, 1984), credit rationing 
(Stiglitz, Weiss, 1981, Bester, 1992, Harris, Raviv, 1992), optimal taxation 
(Mirrlees, 1971, 1986, Roberts, 2000, Saez, 2001), labor contracts (Chari, 1983, 
Green, Kahn, 1983, Grossman, Hart, 1983), regulation (an entire book of 
Laffont and Tirole, 1993), insurance contracts (Fluet, Parnnequin, 1997, Sloan,  
Norton, 1997, Stiglitz, 1997, Villeneuve, 2000, Brunner, Pech, 2006, Resende, 
Zeidan, 2010). 
Recent research shows that the models became more and more complex, 
most of them being mixed models with moral hazard, signalling or screening. 
Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) proposed a mixed model where the Agent’s actual Adverse Selection Models with Three States of Nature 
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choice regarding the effort is an endogenous adverse selection variable at the 
renegotiation stage and this aspect generates inefficiency. This problem was 
partially solved by Matthews (1995) and Ma (1994). Page (1991, 1997) presented a 
mixed model with moral hazard and adverse selection, and Jullien and Salanie 
(2007) extended the moral hazard model for the situation where the Agent’s risk 
aversion constitutes his private information, such that the model presents also an 
adverse selection problem. Such approach was also used by Reichlin and Siconolfi 
(2004); they generalized the pure adverse selection model of Rotschild and Stiglitz, 
including some moral hazard variables. Mylovanov and Schmitz (2008) studied a 
two period moral hazard model, where the Agents are risk neutral, with limited 
liability and three identical activities. 
In the paper we present an adverse selection problem with three states of 
natures, where the partners from the Principal-Agent model are both risk 
neutral. The Principal’s profit depends on Agent’s costly effort and also on 
some exogenous factors, not correlated with Agent’s behaviour; these factors 
are referred as “nature states”. This problem was also studied by Marinescu, 
Miron and Marin (2010) from the perspective of a hazard moral model followed 
by adverse selection with three states of natures. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 1 we present the main 
assumptions of the model and the optimization problem that must be solved for 
deriving the optimal contract. In Section 2 we use a transformation of variables 
and we obtain an equivalent model with informational rents-efforts as variables. 
Section 3 contains the analysis of the model in the situation of asymmetric 
information and in the last part of the paper we summarize the main features of 
the optimal contract and we propose some possible extensions of the model.  
1. The model in the situation of asymmetric information 
Consider a Principal-Agent model and suppose that, after signing the 
contract, the Agent observes (knows) the market conditions – if these 
conditions are good or bad. We denote by θ  the parameter that characterizes 
the market conditions, with the possible values   { }
B M G θ θ θ θ , , ∈ . A high level 
of this variable, 
G θ θ = , indicates a favourable situation for the business (for 
Agent’s activity), while 
M θ θ =  corresponds to a medium situation (a medium 
state of nature), and 
B θ θ =  (bad situation of unfavorable situation on the 
market) implies some decisions regarding the effort with a higher cost than the 
other ones. It is obvious then that 
B M G θ θ θ > > . 
The Agent will exert a level of total effort denoted by E, but this effort 
level cost more when the market conditions are bad. Daniela Marinescu, Dumitru Marin 
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Therefore,  e E + =θ , where the Agent’s decision regarding the effort 
level e is costly, but θ  doesn’t. The Agent will choose the costly effort e, with 
respect to the information he gets from θ . 
The Agent, after signing the contract, observes the true value of the 
variable  θ  (
B θ ,
M θ  or 
G θ ). The Principal observes the total decision E. 
Because he cannot distinguish between the market conditions, the Principal 
doesn’t know the effort level exerted by the Agent. This means that the later 
could exerts a high level of effort or a medium or low level of effort. 
With adverse selection, the Principal has to offer the same menu of 
contracts to all types of Agents and has to anticipate that each type of Agent 
chooses the contract he prefers. Without loss of generality, the Revelation 
Principle says that the Principal can restrict the menu to a set of direct 
revelation mechanisms so that the optimization problem is significantly 
reduced. 
A contract is represented by the couple  
() ( ) E w e w , , ≡ ,  
where: 
w – is the Agent’s wage; 
e – is the costly effort for the Agent; 
E – is the total effort,  θ + = e E ; 
θ  - represents the market conditions. 
 
In such a situation with asymmetry of information, we denote the menu of 
contracts by   ( )( )( ) { } ,, ,,,
GG MM BB we we we . These contracts correspond to the 
three states of nature (market conditions), with the respective probabilities 
G π ,
M π  and 
B π  from the interval ( ) 1 , 0  and with  1 = + +
B M G π π π . 
The menu of optimal contracts is derived solving a nonlinear optimization 
problem that corresponds to a maximization of Principal’s final expected payoff 
(meaning the difference between gross expected payoff and the expected wage), 
subject to the participation and incentive compatibility constraints. 
Suppose that the Principal’s profit is equal to total effort E. Then, 
θ − = E e . 
We also assume that both Principal and the Agent are risk neutral. 
Therefore, for a given value of θ  (a given market characteristic) and for 
the contract denoted by () e w, , the Agent’s utility function is  () e v w− , where: 
() e v  represents the disutility of effort, with the well-known properties: 
() , 0 > ′ e v   () 0 > ′ ′ e v , () 0 > e v  and  ( ) 0 0 = v   
  Adverse Selection Models with Three States of Nature 
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We can now write the Principal’s optimization problem as follows: 
(P) { }
,, , , ,
max
GMB G MB
GG G G MM M M BB B B
ww weee
ew e w ew πθ π θ πθ ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡⎤ +− + +− + +− ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣⎦  
s.t. 
( ) u e v w
G G ≥ −  
( ) u e v w
M M ≥ −  
()
BB wv e u −≥  
( ) ( )
G M M M G G e v w e v w θ θ − + − ≥ −  
( ) ( )
M B B B M M e v w e v w θ θ − + − ≥ −  
( ) ( )
G B B B G G e v w e v w θ θ − + − ≥ −  
( ) ( )
M G G G M M e v w e v w θ θ − + − ≥ −  
( ) ( )
B M M M B B e v w e v w θ θ − + − ≥ −  
( ) ( )
B G G G B B e v w e v w θ θ − + − ≥ −  
(with all variables satisfying the sign constraints – non negativity constraints). 
2. The transformed model – using the variables: informational rents and 
costly effort levels  
In this section we propose a way of solving the model that differs from 
the analysis presented by Marinescu Miron and Marin (2010). 
We first introduce some other notations. 
Let 
B M G U U U , ,  be the Agent’s utility levels obtained in each state of 
nature. Therefore, we can express these informational rents as: 
( )
G G G e v w U − =  
( )
M M M e v w U − =  
( )
B B B e v w U − =  
In the above optimization program we replace the original variables   
( )
M B G B M G e e e w w w , , , , ,  with the new ones ( ) ,, , , ,
GMB G B M UUUeee . 
Another assumption that doesn’t restrict the generality of the model is that 
the parameter values 
G θ ,
M θ  and 
B θ  (the states of nature) are satisfying the 
following condition: 
0 > − = − = Δ
B M M G θ θ θ θ θ  
This means that the spread of uncertainty is the same between these three 
values. 
 Daniela Marinescu, Dumitru Marin 
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Proposition 1. The function  [ ) :0 , f R ∞→ ,  ( ) ( )( ) e v e v e f − Δ + = θ  is a 
strictly positive and strictly increasing function. 
 
Proof  
We use the usual properties of the effort cost function  ( ) v ⋅ , i.e. () 0 > e v , 
() 0 > ′ e v ,  () 0 > ′ ′ e v  and  () 0 0 = v . 
From the property of the monotonic function  ( ) v ⋅  it is obvious that 
() 0 > e f , and from the convexity of this function we have also: 
() ( )( ) 0 > ′ − Δ + ′ = ′ e v e v e f θ  
 
We use all these assumptions for transforming the problem (P) into an 
optimization problem with other variables.  
With this change of variables, the Principal’s objective function can be 
rewritten as: 
( ) { ( )( )
}
,, , ,,
max
GBM G M B
GG G G MM M M BB B B
UUU eee
GG MM BB
ev e e v e ev e
UUU
πθ π θ πθ
ππ π
⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡⎤ +− + +− + +− − ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣⎦
⎡⎤ −++ ⎣⎦
 
This expression shows that the Principal’s objective is maximizing the 
expected social value minus the expected informational rent of the Agent. 
The participation constraints are now represented by the usual sign 
constraints for the variables 
G U , 
B U  and 
M U : 
0 ≥
G U  
0 ≥
B U  
0 ≥
M U . 
 
The upward and downward (local and global) incentive compatibility 
constraints are written using the function  ( ) f ⋅ as follows: 
( ) θ Δ − + ≥
M M G e f U U                              (1) 
( ) θ Δ − + ≥
B B M e f U U                               (2) 
( ) ( ) θ θ Δ − + Δ − + ≥ 2
B B B G e f e f U U     (3) 
( )
G G M e f U U − ≥                                        (4) 
( )
M M B e f U U − ≥                                        (5) 
( ) ( ) θ Δ + − − ≥
G G G B e f e f U U                    (6) 
 Adverse Selection Models with Three States of Nature 
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We show how the constraint (1) is obtained from the incentive 
compatibility constraint: 
( ) ( )
G M M M G G e v w e v w θ θ − + − ≥ −  
The right-hand side of this relation is then: 
() ( )
()()( )
()
MM M G MM
MM M M
MM
wv e wv e
wv e v e v e
Uf e
θθ θ
θ
θ
−+ − = −− Δ
= −+− − Δ
=+ − Δ
 
The constraint (3), written in terms of informational rents and efforts, 
represents a transformation of the upward global constraint: 
( ) ( )
G B B B G G e v w e v w θ θ − + − ≥ −  
 
The right-hand side of the above relation is then: 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) 2
( ) () () ( 2 )
() ( 2 )
BB B G BB B B
BB B B B
BB B
wv e wv e v e V e
Uv ev e v e v e
Uf e f e
θθ θ
θ θθ
θθ
−+ − = − + − − Δ
= + −− Δ +− Δ −− Δ
=+ − Δ + − Δ
 
We obtained in the same way all other constraints. 
The major technical difficulty of the Principal’s program is a great 
number of the constraints imposed by incentive compatibility and participation 
of Agent. We show that the downward constraints (the last three constraints) 
can be ignored when solving the optimization problem. Then we check if the 
optimal solution satisfies these constraints. 
We begin by determining which of the participation constraints are the 
relevant ones.  
 
Proposition 2. If  0 ≥
B U , then  0 >
M U  şi  0 >
G U . 
 
Proof 
Using that  () 0 > e f  and the first two constraints we have: 
( ) 0 > Δ − + ≥ θ
B B M e f U U  
and 
0 > ≥
M G U U . 
 
Therefore, if the participation constraint for the least favourable state is 
satisfied, then all other participation constraints are satisfied. Daniela Marinescu, Dumitru Marin 
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3. The optimal contract in the situation of asymmetric information 
We are now interested in deriving the optimal solution for the program 
presented in the above section, assuming that this program has feasible 
solutions. Before we proceed, we need to proof one more proposition. The 
following Proposition describes the well-known condition from the literature 
“the implementation condition or the monotonicity condition”. 
 
Proposition 3. If the set of feasible solutions (the set of incentive feasible 
contracts) of the program (P) is nonempty, then the following condition holds: 
B B M M G G e e e θ θ θ + ≥ + ≥ +   
(implementability condition). 
 
Proof 
Adding two local (upward and downward) constraints we get:  
( ) θ Δ − + ≥
M M G e f U U  
( )
G G M e f U U − ≥  
 
Then: 
( ) ( ) θ Δ − ≥
M G e f e f  
The function  () f ⋅ is strictly increasing and so, the above relation yields to: 
( )
M G M M G e e e θ θ θ − − = Δ − ≥  or 
M M G G e e θ θ + ≥ +  
The same is done, using (2) and (5): 
( ) ( ) θ Δ − ≥
B M e f e f  
or 
( ),
B M B B M e e e θ θ θ − − = Δ − ≥  
Then: 
B B M M e e θ θ + ≥ +  
We finally get: 
B B M M G G e e e θ θ θ + ≥ + ≥ +  
 
This condition shows that, the higher value of the parameter 
characterising the state of market is, the higher the final payoff is. 
More than this, if the conditions (1) and (2) are satisfied, then the 
constraint (3) also holds. 
Indeed, adding (1) and (2) yields: 
( ) ( ) θ θ Δ − + Δ − + ≥
B M B G e f e f U U  Adverse Selection Models with Three States of Nature 
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But, from the implementability condition 
B B M M e e θ θ + ≥ +  and then: 
() ( ) 2
GB B B U U fe fe θ θ ≥+ − Δ + − Δ  
The results derived above allow us to rewrite the reduced optimization 
program as follows: 
(P’) ( ) { ( ) ( )
}
,, , , ,
max
GMB G M B
GG G G MM M M BB B B
UU Ueee
GG MM BB
ev e e v e ev e
UUU
πθ π θ πθ
ππ π
⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡⎤ +− + +− + +− − ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣⎦
⎡⎤ −++ ⎣⎦
 
s.t. 
( ) θ Δ − + ≥
M M G e f U U              ( 1 )  
( ) θ Δ − + ≥
B B M e f U U                ( 2 )  
0 ≥
B U  
 
This is the final form of the program we solve further.  
First, we show that all the remaining constraints are binding at the 
optimum.  
 
Proposition 4.  At the optimum, the informational rent corresponding to 
the least favourable state satisfies  0 =
B U . 
 
Proof  
Suppose that this is not true. Assume that  0 >
B U . Let  0 > ε  be an 
arbitrary small scalar such that  0 ≥ −ε
B U . 
We have  0 > ≥ ≥
B M G U U U  and then we could reduce the informational 
rents of the other types of Agent such that the relevant constraints continue to 
hold: 
( ) θ ε ε Δ − + − ≥ −
M M G e f U U  
( ) θ ε ε Δ − + − ≥ −
B B M e f U U  
0 ≥ −ε
B U   
In this case, if () ,, , , ,
GMB G M B UUUeee represents the optimal solution, 
then the feasible solution () ,, , , ,
GMB G M B UUUe e e εεε −− −  is better than the 
optimal solution (in the sense that the corresponding value of the objective 
function is higher than the corresponding value of the supposed optimal 
solution) and gives the Principal an extra payoff equal toε . And this is a 
contradiction. 
So 0 =
B U  it is optimal. Daniela Marinescu, Dumitru Marin 
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Therefore, in the least favourable state of nature the participation 
constraint is binding, the Agent obtains the outside opportunity level of utility 
exactly. 
A similar result is true for the incentive compatibility constraint (2). 
 
Proposition 5. The incentive compatibility constraint given by (2) is 
binding at the optimum. 
 
Proof 
Suppose it is not. Assume that  ( ) θ Δ − >
B M e f U . 
Therefore, we can decrease by  0 > ε  the informational rents 
M U  and 
G U ; the program’s constraints are indeed satisfied, but the objective function’s 
value is increased by ( )ε π
B − 1 . But this is again a contradiction. 
Hence,  ( ) θ Δ − =
B M e f U . This means that the informational rent 
associated with the parameter value 
M θ  is strictly positive and higher than the 
corresponding rent associated with  
B θ . 
 
Proposition 6. The constraint  ( ) ( ) θ θ Δ − + Δ − ≥
M B G e f e f U  is binding 
at the optimum. 
 
Proof 
Suppose it is not, i.e.  ( ) ( )
GB M Uf e f e θ θ >− Δ +− Δ  
Then, the feasible solution  ( ) ( ) ,, 0 , , ,
GM B B G M B UU f e Ue e e εθ −= − Δ =  
(the optimal solution is modified) is better than the optimal solution in the sense 
that the objective function’s value is increased by 
G π ε . But this is a 
contradiction. 
Hence, for the state of nature that corresponds to 
G θ , the Agent gets a 
strictly positive informational rent, given by: 
( ) ( ) θ θ Δ − + Δ − =
M B G e f e f U , with  ( ) θ Δ − = >
B M G e f U U . 
 
Substituting the results given by the last three Propositions,  0 =
B U , 
( ) θ Δ − =
B M e f U  and  ( ) ( ) θ θ Δ − + Δ − =
M B G e f e f U  into the reduced 
program () P′ , this problem is transformed into an unconstrained maximization 
problem, with concave obtive function; we denote this new problem by (P”): Adverse Selection Models with Three States of Nature 
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() P′ ′ () ( ) ( ) ( )
,
max , ,
() ( ) ()
GM B
GMB G G G G M B
eee
MM M M B BB B B
Fe e e e ve fe fe
ev e f e e v e
πθ θ θ
πθ θ π θ
⎡⎤ =+ − − − Δ − − Δ + ⎣⎦
⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ =+ − − − Δ + + − ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦
  
 
The necessary and sufficient conditions are:  
0 =
∂
∂
G e
F
 or  ( ) [ ] 0 1 = ′ −
G G e v π                              (7) 
0 =
∂
∂
M e
F
 or  ( ) ( ) [ ] 0 1 = ′ − + Δ − ′ −
M M M G e v e f π θ π         (8) 
0 =
∂
∂
B e
F
  
or  
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] 0 1 = ′ − + Δ − ′ − Δ − ′ −
B B B M B G e v e f e f π θ π θ π                   (9) 
 
From (7) it follows immediately that: 
( ) 1 = ′
G e v              ( 1 0 )  
 
Compared with the full information setting, asymmetric information 
doesn’t affect the effort level corresponding for the characteristic
G θ . So the 
second best effort is efficient for this parameter value. 
 
The first order condition (8) yields to: 
() () 1 1 < Δ − ′ − = ′ θ
π
π M
M
G
M e f e v             ( 1 1 )  
 
This equation gives the second best effort 
M e  associated with the state of 
nature 
M θ . 
The relation (9) can be rewritten as: 
() () () 1 1 < Δ − ′ − Δ − ′ − = ′ θ
π
π
θ
π
π B
B
M
B
M
G
B e f e f e v           (12) 
 
This last equation yields to the second best effort level 
B e  in the case of 
the least unfavourable state of nature. 
 
We can now check that the optimal solution derived above satisfies also 
the ignored constraints. 
 Daniela Marinescu, Dumitru Marin 
 
44 
Proposition 7. The second best optimal informational rents: 
( ) ( ) θ θ Δ − + Δ − =
M B G e f e f U , 
( ) θ Δ − =
B M e f U , 
0 =
B U , 
satisfy also the downward (local and global) incentive constraints. 
 
Proof 
We substitute the above expressions of the informational rents into each 
ignored incentive constraint. We then have: 
i) The constraint (4):  
( )
G G M e f U U − ≥   
becomes: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
G M B B e f e f e f e f − Δ − + Δ − ≥ Δ − θ θ θ  
or  
( ) ( ) θ Δ − ≥
M G e f e f  
 
The function  () f ⋅  being strictly increasing, it follows that: 
θ Δ − ≥
M G e e  
 
But this is true, from the implementability condition 
M M G G e e θ θ + ≥ + . 
 
ii) The constraint (5):  
( )
M M B e f U U − ≥   
becomes: 
( ) ( )
M B e f e f − Δ − ≥ θ 0 
or 
( ) ( ) θ Δ − ≥
B M e f e f  
The function  () f ⋅  being strictly increasing, it follows that: 
θ Δ − ≥
B M e e  
and this is an equivalent relation to the implementability condition:  
B B M M e e θ θ + ≥ +  
 
iii) The constraint (6) is a consequence of (4) and (5). Adding (4) and (5) 
we get: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) θ Δ + − − ≥ − − ≥
G G G M G G B e f e f U e f e f U U ,  Adverse Selection Models with Three States of Nature 
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where the last inequality was written using the implementability condition and 
the monotonic property of  () f ⋅ . 
Hence, we obtain: 
( ) ( ) θ Δ + − − ≥
G G G B e f e f U U , and this is exactly the constraint (6). 
 
4. Conclusions 
We derived in the last section the necessary and sufficient condition for 
the optimal solution in the situation of asymmetric information. We can now 
summarize the main features of the optimal menu of contracts in the following 
theorem: 
Theorem. Under adverse selection with three states of nature, the optimal 
menu of contracts entails: 
A. No effort distortion for the most favourable state of nature ()
G θ  with 
respect to the first best level 
G G e e ~ = . This efficient level is given by (10): 
( ) 1 = ′
G e v  
 
B. A downward distortion for the characteristics 
M θ  and 
B θ . The equations 
(11) and (12) yield to the second best effort levels 
M e  and 
B e , where: 
M M e e ~ <  and  
B B e e ~ <  
These effort levels are inefficient with respect to the corresponding first best 
levels, for both states of nature (the medium one and the least favourable one). 
 
C. The optimal (second best) informational rents are given by: 
( ) ( ) θ θ Δ − + Δ − =
M B G e f e f U  
( )
G B M U e f U < Δ − = θ  
0 =
B U  
The Agents acting in good or medium market conditions get strictly 
informational rents, while the Agent who acts in an unfavourable state of nature 
gets no informational rent  
 
D. The second best optimal transfers are respectively given by: 
( )
G G G e v U w + =  
( )
M M M e v U w + =  
( )
B B e v w =  Daniela Marinescu, Dumitru Marin 
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While the Agents acting in a good or medium market conditions get a 
level of transfer higher than their disutility of costly effort, the Agent acting in 
an unfavourable state of nature gets a transfer exactly equal to his effort 
disutility. 
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